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Sustainability of the Turkish PAYGO System’s 
Generosity in People’s Eyes 
 
Yigit Aydede •
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: An unsustainable pay-as-you-go system produces two outcomes: 
generous social security wealth and uncertainty about this wealth.  Consistent 
with the literature, the results of my previous study indicate that the 
unprecedented generosity of the Turkish paygo boosts consumption. In this 
present study, when the second effect is controlled, the results imply that 
declining expectations on the sustainability of the paygo system may reduce 
consumption.  What is the net consequence of these two opposite effects on 
consumption?  This paper models this ambiguity in the literature and confirms its 
existence for Turkey.     
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An unsustainable pay-as-you-go (paygo) system produces two outcomes: 
generous social security wealth (SSW) and uncertainty about this wealth.  A 
review of the literature indicates that the debate over how social security wealth 
impacts saving is far being resolved and the best modeling approach for testing 
the argument is unclear. By their nature, SSW series represent expected pension 
wealth and aggregate time-series studies assume that there is no uncertainty about 
these expectations. However, this is an unrealistic assumption because as 
parametric reforms are used to secure paygo systems in the face of cumulating 
adverse demographic shocks, people may become uncertain about their future net 
pension entitlements.  
 
Two years ago I published a paper (Aydede, 2008) analyzing the effect of the 
Turkish pension system on saving.  In that paper, I used SSW series calculated for 
the first time for Turkey and showed that the generosity of the Turkish paygo 
boosts consumption.  Unlike time-series studies investigating developed countries 
with relatively stable paygo systems, my initial work analyzes an exceptional 
case: the Turkish paygo is the most generous pension system in the Organization 
for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) region while it is totally 
insolvent.1 The system’s deficit is 4.5 per cent gross national product (GNP) in 
2004. Between 1990 and 2003, the present value of the total resources used to 
finance its deficit is almost equal to the GNP created in 2003.2
 
  
The fact that paygo systems around the world have been increasingly 
unsustainable is not controlled by previous works in the literature.  This is 
particularly an important missing factor for Turkey because when people (mostly 
young cohorts) expect social security promises may not be honored by the 
government, they may consume less and save more. The results in my earlier 
paper imply that social security depresses saving around 24 per cent.3
 
 In this 
present study, when I control the uncertainty, the results imply that declining 
expectations about the sustainability of the paygo system reduce consumption.  
What is the net aggregate consequence of these two opposite effects on 
consumption?  The present study argues that the coefficient of SSW in aggregate 
time-series analyses cannot be used to measure its impact on saving without 
controlling the uncertainty about SSW.   
This paper relates to an extensive body of literature.  More specifically, it refers to 
studies by Feldstein (1974, 1996), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983), and Blake 
(2004) on social security and saving; Kotlikoff (2003) on intergenerational 
                                               
1 Pension at a Glance, OECD (2005, 2006). 
2 The World Bank Report 2003. 
3 The calculation is given in Appendix 2. 
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redistribution of wealth by paygo systems; and Brook and Whitehouse (2006) and 
the OECD reports (2005, 2006) on generosity and generational fairness of the 
Turkish pension system. First, I will explain the model and, then test the model’s 
predictions with two different econometric frameworks.  To compare the 
empirical results with those in my previous study, I will start with the same 
econometric approach then extend it with a vector error correction model.  I 
interpret the results at the end.  To get to the point, I did not portray the Turkish 
social security system and avoided providing detailed information about the 
literature and the data used in this assessment.  The information about those 
matters can be found in the TUSIAD’s report (2003) and the recent studies by 
Blake (2004) and Aydede (2008) respectively. 
 
The Model 
 
When the planner faces an adverse shock and decides on a parametric reform to 
secure the system, expectations about the future can deviate from what the 
planner promises—depending on sustainability of the actual policy in people’s 
eyes. For example, when the young are asked to raise their contributions to the 
system to keep the current benefit level constant,4
 
 they may question not only this 
policy’s credibility but also the system’s ability to honor its promises to them in 
the future. 
To show formally how expectations on the pension system affect total 
consumption, I use a simple two-period overlapping-generations model where 
there is no productive capital and identical individuals are endowed by w. They 
save (s) in the first period, then retire and spend their saving in the second period. 
There is no uncertainty in lifetime, liquidity constraint, bequest, and growth in 
endowment. To avoid defining the utility function explicitly, I assume that the 
real interest rate (r) is equal to the personal discount rate (ρ). The planner runs a 
balanced paygo system where the young, y, pay taxes, τ, and the seniors, o, 
receive benefits, b. In all periods …, t − 2, t − 1, there exists a steady state with 
 
(1)                                                  ,)1( ττ nbLRb +=⇒=  
 
R and L stand for numbers of retirees (the old) and workers (the young) 
respectively. The population grows by n, which is the implicit rate of return (IRR) 
                                               
4 The planner can keep the benefit and contribution levels unchanged by financing the deficit with 
public debt, which shifts the burden onto unborn generations. 
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of the system.5
 
   In period t there is an adverse demographic shock (θ), so that nt = 
n − θt. Consequently, the budget of the pension system changes to  
(2)                                            ).)(1( sttt nb ττθ +−+=  
 
The government uses tax surcharges (τs) and splits the fiscal burden θtτ between 
existing generations at time t so that elderly and young cohorts have to bear a 
share 1− δt and δt respectively.  Consequently, we have 
 
(3)                                               .)1( τθδ ttt bb −−=  
 
Substituting (3) into (2) and using the definition for b (1) we can derive  
 
(4)                                                   .
1 t
tts
t n θ
τθδ
τ
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=  
 
Note that if δt = 1 we have bt = b so that the old in t bear no burden from the 
shock. In this sense, when an adverse shock hits, the planner’s decision on δ 
becomes a parametric reform for the existing paygo system and constitutes 
unexpected wealth transfers among generations similar to those at the system’s 
introduction point, where the initial seniors receive a windfall.6
 
  
From the individual’s perspective, shocks are recognized when the young are 
required to pay tax surcharges (τs), and they form their expectations on δ in the 
first period determined by the planner in the second period.   Formally, every 
young person who is required to pay taxes and tax surcharges maximizes 
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5 The condition for balanced budget (1) implies that when IRR is equal to r the paygo system does 
not reduce resources of existing generations, i.e. the implicit tax rate (see Sinn, 2000) is zero, so 
that .)1/()1/( wrbwrcc oy =++−=++ τ      
6 When δ is set to one for all current and future generations, if the implicit rate of return is less 
than r, the young at time t and next generations face a burden since the implicit tax rate rises from 
zero to a positive number.  
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If the utility function satisfies the conventional conditions and ρ = r, the young at 
time t solves this problem with the following values: 
   
[ ] (5)                              ,)1(
2
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+ ++−−+
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rc tt
s
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[ ] (6)                                   .)2/(1 1+−−−+= ttstt bEwrs ττ  
 
Given that all individuals recognize that the planner commits to a balanced budget 
(2), the young’s expectation about benefits at t becomes:  
 
(7)                                ).)(1( 1111
s
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Assuming that Etθt+1 = 0, and using (4), we obtain 
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Using (8) and the fact that ),1()1( 1 tt nn θ−+=+ +  (7) becomes 
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Substituting (9) and (4) into (5), we obtain  
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Likewise, the old also face the following consumption function at time t: 
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Since Et-1θt = 0 and τ)1(1 nbE tt +=− , when we substitute (2) for bt, (11) becomes: 
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By using (10) and (12), the marginal effect of the policy on the total consumption, 
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yttottt cLcRC += , can be observed as follows: 
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where we use 1)1( −−+= ttt LnL θ  with Lt-1 (i.e. Rt) normalized to one.  Note that 
the sign of (13) depends on the sign of the expression in the brackets. In other 
words, even if the system promises a generous SSW by setting δ to one, when it is 
not sustainable in people’s eyes, consumption may decline. The diversion 
between expectations and the actual policy becomes more likely as each 
generation faces increasing tax surcharges (or rising public debt) in the face of 
cumulating shocks.  Consequently, a binding policy (a constant δ) grows to be 
unsustainable, as implied by (14) below. 
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which has to be less than or equal to (w-τ). This brings up a possibility that the 
planner may decide to end the program (gradually or all at once) so that the 
expectation about the policy variable (δ) can realistically be lower than zero.7
 
 This 
brings up a theoretical ambiguity to how a Ponzi-scheme-like paygo affects 
consumption. 
                                               
7 If we allow that expected benefits can be zero at time s as follows, 
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we obtain the following constraint for expectations on the policy variable:  
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which is bounded at the minimum by a negative value.  To see it explicitly, suppose that the 
system is terminated in the first period when n = 0: the lower limit reduces to (θ – 1)/θ. 
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Empirical Test 
My empirical goal here is to test the existence of this theoretical ambiguity in 
time-series models for Turkey.  More specifically, I want to test how the 
perception of the system’s unprecedented generosity by the young cohorts affects 
consumption. To be consistent, I will first apply the same econometric approach 
used by Feldstein (1970, 1996) and then estimate vector error correction models 
with two additional variables: (1) the change in expected implicit rate of return 
(IRR) for younger cohorts and (2) the system’s dependency ratio, which is the 
number of workers per retiree. 
Based on (13), the second variable is supposed to capture the effect of differences 
in marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of rest-of-the-life resources 
between retirees and workers on consumption.8  I expect this effect to be negative. 
My prior expectation on the first variable is positive and can be justified by total 
consumption aggregated at time t+1:9
 
 
(15)                            ).(
2
1
11211 tttttttt EEwC δδδδτθ −+−+= +++++  
 
If the policy is binding and credible it becomes irrelevant, as expected, in terms of 
its effect on consumption in the second and subsequent periods. This can be seen 
when 1211 ++++ === tttttt EE δδδδ .  However, even if the planner maintains the 
same policy in the long run as Ttt δδδ ===< + ...0 1 , when expectations deviate 
from the actual policy, (15) becomes: 
 
16)(                                   ).(
2
1
1211 ++++ −+= tttttt EEwC δδτθ  
 
Note that declining expectations (Et+1δt+2 < Etδt+1) of the contemporaneous young 
can reduce total consumption.  
 
Even though the specification of conventional aggregate consumption functions 
has become increasingly more sophisticated over the years, a typical aggregate 
time-series study tests changes in consumption due to pension wealth. It is 
obvious from (10) and (12) that when n − θ  > r, SSW becomes positive and (16) 
                                               
8 In the model, since MPC for the old is higher than MPC for the young, the difference reflected 
by 1/(2+r) in (13) is positive.  Therefore, if the old consume more as the model implies, a decline 
in the system’s dependency ratio should affect consumption negatively. (See Kotlikoff 2003). 
9 See the Appendix 1 for its derivation. 
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can be expresses by 
  
17)(                              ),,,,,( 1 ttttttt XdMPCESSWwfC +∆= δ  
 
where dMPC is the difference between MPCs of the young and the old and X is 
the vector of other control variables, such as housing wealth, financial wealth, 
liquidity constraints and so on. This representation is also consistent with 
traditional life-cycle models in the subject (Ando and Modigliani, 1963; Barro 
1974; Feldstein 1996; Blake 2004). 
 
The key component of this specification is 1+∆ ttE δ , which represents the system 
stability perceived by the young cohorts. I use the change in IRR of the paygo 
system expected by the new members as a proxy.  More specifically, when we 
define expected IRR as ,1)/()1( 111 −++=
−
++
s
ttttt rbEE ττφ  1+∆ ttE δ can be 
expressed as follows:10
 
 
(18)                               ),( 121121 ++++++ −=− ttttttttt EEEE φφγδδ  
 
where ).1/()]1(1[ ttt θδθλ −−−=  
 
I calculated IRR series in a separate study (Aydede, 2009) from 1970 to 2003 by 
using the same method I applied in the aggregate SSW simulations (Aydede 
2008).  I find the net SSW, which is the difference between the present value of 
contributions and benefits expected by young cohorts based on survival 
probabilities and the system’s parameters. The results are summarized in Table 1 
below.11
 
   
                                               
10 See Appendix 1 for its derivation. 
11 The details about the simulation are given in Appendix 3. 
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Table 1: Expected Implicit Rate of Return (IRR) for New Members 
(TL in 1987 prices) 
Birth Year at 17 P.V. of Benefits P.V. of Taxes SSW IRR
1953 1970 2,628,340 1,312,728 1,315,612 100%
1958 1975 3,969,752 2,271,582 1,698,170 75%
1963 1980 2,300,589 2,939,206 -638,617 -22%
1968 1985 1,933,805 3,481,683 -1,547,879 -44%
1973 1990 2,810,633 3,970,193 -1,159,560 -29%
1978 1995 2,233,560 3,929,594 -1,696,034 -43%
1983 2000 4,257,867 6,434,893 -2,177,026 -34%
1984 2001 3,974,374 5,044,661 -1,070,286 -21%
1985 2002 4,392,501 4,308,405 84,096 2%
1986 2003 5,102,381 4,259,426 842,955 20%
Source: Aydede (2009) 
 
Based on (17), I start with the following estimator: 
  
 (19)                DR,ΔEIRRUnUrbanLFPR
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with the same set of variables12
 
 and the data as used in my previous study. The 
only difference in (19) is that I add ∆EIRR and DR― changes in expected IRR for 
new members of the system and the number of workers per retiree, respectively. 
As in all time-series studies, the specification (19) raises two immediate issues, 
autocorrelation and simultaneity, which I will address throughout the estimations. 
The regression results in Table A1 (given in Appendix 4) follow the same order as 
in my previous study: the first estimation is the baseline estimation, which suffers 
from the apparent autocorrelation problem. The series in the second and third 
estimations use AR(1) and AR(2) transformation. The forth estimation is the 
extended version of the first one with all variables.  In estimation 5 and 6, after 
confirming their very low pair-wise correlations, I remove insignificant variables 
by using the Wald test.  The last one applies a two-stage-least-squares estimation 
to solve simultaneity problem, where I use government spending, net export, and 
investment as instrumental variables for private disposable income.  In Estimation 
6, inclusion of dummy variable improves Akaike and Schwrz criterion relative to 
                                               
12 The list of variables and data sources is given in Appendix.   
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Estimation 5.  As expected, results improve when the estimation is specified well 
and autocorrelation is removed. Therefore, I consider the last three estimations as 
being more reliable among all.  The first observation of all estimations confirms 
that the variables ∆EIRR and DR have stable and consistent signs with what the 
model suggests and their robustness picks up in the last three estimations.  
Comparing the current results with my earlier ones shows that the inclusion of 
∆EIRR and DR does not change sign and significance of the other variables. 
  
Table A2 show the estimation results of three additional specifications. The first 
two specifications use Equation 6 (in Table A1) with and without new variables 
(∆EIRR and DR) after the logarithmic transformation.  The linearity provided by 
the log transformation improves the significance of new variables.  The results 
confirm that the coefficient of SSWG (SSW-gross) is not sensitive to log 
transformation. Moreover, a comparison of the first two columns implies that 
controlling the uncertainty increases the effect of SSWG.  The last column applies 
the first-difference to the specification in column (2) and shows the elasticities.  
While the results do not change fundamentally when the variables are presented in 
growths, we observe that SSWG becomes insignificant.  
 
Although, the time-series literature in our subject implicitly uses Durbin-Watson 
(DW) statistics to detect the “spurious significance” problem, I apply both a 
residual-based test in a single equation as well as the Johansen cointegration test.  
The second specification in Table A2, which rises as a reference regression 
among all, contain I(1) variables expect for ∆EIRR and DR, which are I(0). The 
ADF test rejects the unit-root in the error term at the 10% significance-level, 
indicating that the results are not spurious.13
 
 
The advantage of a vector error correction (VEC) model is that it has cointigration 
relations built in the specification so that it restricts the log-run behaviour of the 
endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating relationships while 
allowing for short-run adjustments.    Hence, I relax the exogeneity assumption on 
income and real interest rate in the second specification in Table A2.  The 
Johansen test results given in Table A3 indicate one cointregrating relation for 
each model. 
 
Table A4 reports the results of the unconditional VEC model using the two lags of 
the first differences of the endogenous variables and the error term. The speed of 
                                               
13 The test statistics for the null hypothesis stating there is a unit root in residuals is -5.607. 
McKinnon critical value at %5 and 10% significance-levels (for n=34 with constant and trend in 
the cointegrating equation that includes 7 variables) is -5.9398 and -5.5109.  For further discussion 
see McKinnon (1993).   
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adjustment coefficient for the error correction term in the consumption equation is 
negative and significant, implying that deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
are corrected by reduction in consumption in the next period. Moreover, all three 
variables of interest (SSWG, ∆EIRR, and DR) are statistically significant and their 
signs are consistent with what we expect.  It is interesting to observe that a 1-
percent decline in expectations (measured by change in EIRR) reduces 
consumption by 0.21 percent.  This decline, however, is offset by the positive 
impact of SSW on consumption, which has the elasticity of 0.22 with respect to 
SSW.  The results also provide evidence that a decrease in dependency ratio 
(number of workers per retiree) increases consumption through the MPC effect. 
 
All other variables are consistent with our prior expectations.  The negative 
impact of financial wealth, which is proxied by money supply (M2), may reflect 
the fact that when nominal interest rates are not so responsive, the real money 
balance could be negatively related to consumption.  Even though it is not 
significant, housing wealth, which is controlled by the direct and imputed income 
from dwellings, increases consumption.  Lastly, the significant relationship 
between consumption and credit constraint proxied by per capita credit to private 
sector confirms the fact that as people barrow against their future income and 
illiquid assets, consumption increases.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
How does the generosity of the Turkish paygo affect saving?  This is an 
important question because pension wealth is the biggest part of household 
wealth in Turkey.  The results in my earlier study show that SSW has robust 
positive effects on consumption. Following Feldstein’s (1996) approach I 
quantify the reduction in saving to show the magnitude of coefficients: the 
existence of the paygo system reduces the national saving in 2003 around 24 per 
cent.  Feldstein finds it between 30-60 per cent for the US.  This approach has 
been criticized in the literature on the basis of SSW calculations: SSW series 
reflect expectations not accrued values.  How people, particularly young cohorts, 
form their expectations on their future pension entitlements is an open question.  
This fact is not controlled in time-series studies. As they are far from retirement, 
this uncertainty grows for younger cohorts and reduces the impact of expected 
pension wealth on their current consumption, particularly in countries with 
unstable public pension systems. The results here imply that negative effects of 
expectations on consumption and declining dependency ratios bring up an 
empirical ambiguity to the literature. This paper is the first study that tests this 
12 
 
ambiguity in the aggregate time-series literature and confirms its existence for 
Turkey.     
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Appendix 1 
 
If we assume that 
Derivation of (14) 
0=−= ttnr θ  and 011 == ++ tttE θθ , (10) becomes: 
  
[ ]12
1
++−= tttttyt Ewc δτθτδθ .     (A1) 
 
Since 11 )1( ++ ++= ttot bsrc , we obtain: 
 
[ ] 11 )1( ++ +−+−+= tytttot bcwrc τδθτ ,    (A2) 
 
where 11 ++ −= tttb τδθτ . Similarly to (10), the young also have the following 
consumption function at time t+1: 
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To aggregate (A2) and (A3), we use 1
2
1 )1( −+ −+= tttt LnL θ .  Because Lt-1 (i.e. Rt) 
was normalized to one before and, given the assumptions that 01 =+tθ  and
01 =−=+ ttt nn θ , the number of retirees and workers is reduced to
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1 ==−+= +−+ ttttt RLnL θ .  By substituting (A2) and (3) into
11111 +++++ += yttottt cLcRC we obtain (14). 
 
To simply the derivation, we assume that n = r = 0 and 
Derivation of (16) 
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and at time t+1 
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We assume that the policy is binding so that ....21 δδδδδ ===== +++ stttt Using 
this fact in (A4) and (A5) results in (16). 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Applying the Feldstein’s method (1996), we can assess the quantitative 
importance of SSW’s coefficient. In my previous paper, the coefficient of SSW 
ranges from 0.0165 to 0.313 with different assumptions in SSW definitions.  In 
other words, every additional 1 TL of SSW increases consumption between 
0.0165 and 0.0313 TL.  For instance, in 2003, the consumption is 4,816,282 
million TL (283,310,716 million TL SSW― with 1987 prices― times 0.0165) 
higher than would be the case without the public social security. This implies the 
same amount of reduction in private saving.  Moreover, since the private 
disposable income is reduced by the total contributions to the pension system 
(5,943,740 million TL), using the estimated marginal propensity to save (72% in 
Table 4, Equation 6), we can conclude that social security contributions also 
reduce saving by 4,279,493 million TL.  Consequently, the total reduction in 
private saving (since the system works on paygo basis, national saving declines 
by the same amount as well) amounts 9,095,775 million TL (4,279,493 + 
4,816,282).   The national saving is 29,482,465 million TL in 2003, which would 
be 38,578,240 million TL without the paygo system.  This implies that the 
pension system reduces national saving 24%, when it is calculated by the 
coefficient of 0.0165 and could increase as higher coefficients being used.  As 
stated earlier, this measure cannot reflect a “true” value of the reduction.  
However, it indicates the quantitative importance of a positive coefficient of 
SSW.  
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Appendix 3 
 
If an individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to the retirement age (ra) and if his 
current wage (or income that the old-age security is based on), w(a,t), grows at a constant 
rate of growth, g, then he will have wt+ra−a = wt(1+g)(ra−a), at the retirement age of ra.  In 
order to calculate the first annuity for this individual, we use a benefit factor, (bf), which 
is basically the ratio of his first annuity to his last wage (or to his insurable income if he 
is a self-employed individual).  Given the benefit factor, the individual will be entitled to 
his first annuity at ra, which is: B(a,t)=bftwt(1+g)(ra−a) .  If we further assume that real 
annuities grow after ra by ga until the age of death (da), given the survival probabilities, 
S(i,j), for that particular individual, the actuarial present value of future annuities (PVA) 
can be calculated at ra, where S(i,j) presents the probability of living at least to the age of j, 
given that the person lived to the age i. 
 
With the personal discount rate (d) for future real incomes, at the age of ra, present value 
of annuities becomes: 
 
 ∑ −−−
≥≥
++= )()(),(),( )1()1(
ranran
tanra
randa
ra dgBSPVA  
 
At time (t), after substituting B(a,t) into PVA above, the person has the following expected 
present value of benefits at the age of a: 
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This also includes survival probabilities between the age of retirement (ra) and the 
current age (a) at time (t).  If the same individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to 
age ra and if his current wage (or income that the old-age security is based on), w(a,t), 
grows at a constant rate of growth, g, then the expected present value of all his future 
contributions until age ra can be calculated as follows: 
 
 [ ] amt
ra
am
amtmata dgWSSSTX
−
=
−+ ++= ∑ )1/()1(,, θ  
 
where θ is the ratio of Social Security taxes to his wages through his working years, and 
the person expects that at age m he will pay a tax of Tt+m−a=θt+m−awt(1+g)m−a.  Using these 
two definitions, SSWG and SSWT, I simulated present value of contributions and taxes 
expected by young cohorts.   
 
The details of this simulation and data resources can be found in Aydede (2008). 
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Appendix 4 
Table A1: Estimation Results of (18) 
Estimation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Income 0.513 0.493 0.575 0.358 0.265 0.240 0.145
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07
SSWG 0.022 0.027 0.037 0.019 0.020 0.030 0.035
0.11 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.00
∆EIRR 31,236 24,243 25,005 28,781 35,731 35,586 43,229
0.28 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.07 0.04
DR -18,991 -11,776 -19,360 -9,591 -9,725 -15,592 -16,923
0.08 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.39 0.13 0.12
HW 1.366 1.499 2.123 0.562 1.125 1.174 0.919
0.02 0.02 0.00 0.54 0.01 0.00 0.02
FW -0.094 -0.190 -0.251 -0.238 1.125 -0.173 -0.181
0.22 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01
R -86,987 -104,471 -96,263 -111,082
0.25 0.02 0.02 0.01
CRTP 0.363 0.478 0.484 0.544
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inf -132.79
0.77
Old -116,822
0.31
Young -32,668
0.19
LFPR 8,425
0.16
Un -525,519
0.42
Urban -16,952
0.28
Time 2,766 556 18,697 6,823 6,291 8,123
0.5 0.92 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.01
D95 46,894 41,560 59,637 63,430
0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01
Constant 353,952 322,443 254,515 2,386,385 412,598 450,844 526,267
0.01 0.02 0.14 0.19 0 0 0
AR(1)ρ 0.4984 0.813
0.03 0
AR(2)ρ -0.6597
0
DW 1.1913 1.5534 1.8484 2.4596 2.1186 2.1588 2.186
R2 0.973 0.980 0.985 0.990 0.987 0.991 0.990
SSR 2.21E+10 1.51E+10 1.02E+10 8.33E+09 1.03E+10 7.60E+09 8.24E+09
W 0.024 0.4019 0.824 0.2179 0.2012 0.7384 0.4427
LM 0.0028 0.2026
(1) All variables are in levels and deflated to 1987 prices, except for ratios and 
Notes:   
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SSW which is in 1987 prices by calculation.  Data sources are provided in my 
previous paper. 
(2) Probabilities for coefficient being zero are given below the values of 
coefficients. 
(3) W represents the White test, the probability that the estimation does not suffer 
heteroskedasticity. 
(4) Since Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is not strictly applicable with 
autoregressive transformation, I use the Breusch-Godfrey test to diagnose 
autocorrelation.  The probability of there is no first-degree autocorrelation is 
given next to LM. 
(5) I assume that the error term follows the first-order autoregressive scheme in 
Estimation 2 as µt = ρµt−1+εt, where ε is a white noise process.  
(6) R2 is adjusted R2 and SSR denotes the sum of squared residuals. 
(7) Correlation between SSWG and ∆EIRR is close to zero. 
(8) Since the estimations use time-series data and high DW statistics do not 
necessarily ensure that results are not spurious, I used the same residual-based 
cointegration test as in my previous study, which indicates that results are not 
spurious. 
C represents consumption expenditures including durable goods. 
Variables: 
Ye is the permanent income estimated by the current private disposable income. 
HW denotes wealth in real estate proxied by imputed rents from ownerships of 
dwellings. 
FW is for financial wealth proxied by Money-Quasi Money (M2). 
CRPT is ‘credit to private sector’ to control liquidity constraint. 
R is real interest rate calculated on nominal interest rates 1-year time deposit 
accounts and consumer price inflation. 
Inf is for capturing uncertainty calculated on 3-year moving average consumer 
price index. 
Young and Old are the dependency ratios for the number of people younger than 
15 and older than 65 relative to working population (15-65). 
LFPR is labour force participation rate to control very low retirement age and the 
effect of informal labour force. 
Urban captures the rapid change in urbanization in the last 40 years by 
calculating the ratio of number of people living in cities relative to the whole 
population. 
Un represents unemployment which is a part of permanent income. 
D95 represents a dummy for year 1995 to control the outlier tested by using one-
step-ahead prediction errors about the zero line. 
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Table A2: Estimation results after log transformation 
Estimation 1 2 3
LIncome 0.3120 0.2157 0.4836
0.0000 0.0240 0.0000
LSSWG 0.0384 0.0660 0.0353
0.0528 0.0025 0.2449
∆LEIRR 0.0511 0.0396
0.0307 0.0295
LDR -0.1092 -0.1439
0.0505 0.0348
LHW 0.1127 0.0701 0.0518
0.0000 0.0153 0.1932
LFW -0.1424 -0.1435 -0.1818
0.0025 0.0000 0.0000
LR -0.0845 -0.0811 -0.0434
0.0730 0.0639 0.3282
LCRTP 0.1445 0.1602 0.1074
0.0000 0.0000 0.0043
Time 0.0114 0.0008
0.0000 0.0211
D95 0.0048 0.0488 0.1074
0.0514 0.0343 0.0001
Constant 7.4720 8.8787
0.0000 0.0000
DW 1.7619 2.1137 2.1206
R2 0.9827 0.9851 0.8569
Notes: (1) All variables are in logs.  (2) Standard errors are robust and probabilities for coefficient 
being zero are given below the values of coefficients. (3) R2 is adjusted R2.  (4) Column 3 
represents the first-difference estimator.  (5) Variables are as defined before. 
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Table A3: The Johansen test results 
Included observations: 31
Series: LConsumption Lincome LRINTR
Exogenous series: D(LEIRR) D(LSSWG) LDR D(LFW) D(LHW) D(CRTP)
Lags interval: 1 to 2
 Selected (0.05 level*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Trace 1 1 1 1 1
Max-Eig 1 1 1 1 1
 *Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)
 Information Criteria by Rank and Model
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Rank or No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No. of CEs No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0 179.3258 179.3258 181.3359 181.3359 182.8517
1 189.3445 190.5452 192.3982 196.9322 197.5534
2 192.6878 195.3482 197.0742 202.5087 202.7202
3 194.2529 197.0879 197.0879 203.0541 203.0541
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0 -10.40812 -10.40812 -10.34425 -10.34425 -10.24849
1 -10.66738 -10.68033 -10.67085  -10.89885* -10.80989
2 -10.49599 -10.5386 -10.58543 -10.80701 -10.75614
3 -10.20987 -10.19922 -10.19922 -10.39058 -10.39058
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0 -9.575481 -9.575481 -9.372842 -9.372842 -9.138311
1 -9.557201 -9.523893 -9.421898 -9.603634* -9.422165
2 -9.108256 -9.058351 -9.058927 -9.187996 -9.090866
3 -8.54459 -8.395173 -8.395173 -8.447763 -8.447763  
Notes: (1) All variables are in logs.  (2) To pick the optimal lag length of the models, we estimated VAR 
models with maximum 6 lags and then decided on the lag where the AIC and SBC values at the 
minimum. 
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Table A4: Unconditional vector error correction model 
Cointegrating Eq: LCONS(-1) LY(-1) LRINTR(-1) Trend C
CointEq1 1.0000 -1.9246 -1.0788 0.0605 11.8651
0.4514 0.2564 0.0204
Error Correction: D(LCONS) D(LY) D(LRINTR)
CointEq1 -0.1888 -0.0425 0.6009
0.0536 0.1095 0.2013
D(LCONS(-1)) -0.1551 -0.0519 0.2213
0.1749 0.3571 0.6568
D(LCONS(-2)) -0.3295 -0.3587 -0.1930
0.1736 0.3543 0.6517
D(LY(-1)) -0.4089 -0.0776 0.2386
0.1484 0.3029 0.5571
D(LY(-2)) 0.0029 0.1484 0.4176
0.1942 0.3964 0.7291
D(LRINTR(-1)) -0.0848 0.1035 0.2410
0.0707 0.1444 0.2656
D(LRINTR(-2)) -0.0412 -0.0586 0.1021
0.0449 0.0917 0.1686
C 0.1458 0.0642 -0.3677
0.0384 0.0784 0.1442
D(LIRR) 0.2132 0.3434 0.1531
0.0377 0.0770 0.1416
D(LSSWG) 0.2210 0.3294 -0.2219
0.0469 0.0958 0.1761
LDR -0.1081 -0.0428 0.3213
0.0325 0.0663 0.1219
D(LM2) -0.2434 -0.2320 0.3225
0.0575 0.1173 0.2157
D(LDWELL) 0.0675 -0.0837 -0.2859
0.0557 0.1137 0.2091
D(LCRTP) 0.0865 0.0777 0.3061
0.0384 0.0784 0.1441
 R-squared 0.9087 0.6824 0.7055
 Adj. R-squared 0.8389 0.4395 0.4802
 Sum sq. resids 0.0080 0.0332 0.1124
 S.E. equation 0.0217 0.0442 0.0813
 F-statistic 13.0204 2.8095 3.1321
 Log likelihood 84.1264 62.0009 43.1118
 Akaike AIC -4.5243 -3.0968 -1.8782
 Schwarz SC -3.8767 -2.4492 -1.2306
 Mean dependent 0.0140 0.0189 0.0016
 Notes: (1) All variables are in logs.  (2) D and L in front of variables represent difference and log values, 
respectively.  (3) Values under the coefficients are standard errors.  (4) Endogenous variables are Cons 
(consumption), Y (income) and RINTR (real interest rate) which are I(1).  Exogenous variables, IRR 
(expected implicit rate of return – I(1)), SSWG (social security wealth − I(1)), DR (dependency ratio – 
I(0)), M2 (financial wealth – I(1)), Dwell (housing wealth – I(1), and CRTP (credit to private sector I(1).  
(5) To pick the optimal lag length of the models, we estimated VAR models with maximum 10 lags and 
then decided on the lag where the AIC and SBC values at the minimum. 
